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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2885 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MARK SLEBODA, 
  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No. 3-06-cr-00385-004) 
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on March 10, 2017 
 
Before: HARDIMAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, and STENGEL, District Judge. 
 
(Opinion filed: May 24, 2017) 
   
 
OPINION** 
   
                                              
 The Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel, United States District Judge for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Mark Sleboda appeals the revocation of his supervised release and the 
resulting ten-month sentence imposed.  Because he has now completed his sentence, we 
will dismiss his appeal as moot. 
Sleboda’s underlying criminal sentence began in 2010, when the District Court 
sentenced him to forty-two months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release for 
violations of federal controlled substances laws.  Sleboda completed his term of 
imprisonment in 2013 and commenced his period of supervised release.  Before 
Sleboda’s supervised release period concluded, however, the District Court’s Probation 
Office filed a petition for revocation, citing instances of continued controlled substances 
possession.  Sleboda admitted to some of the possession charges at the revocation 
hearing, and the District Court proceeded to revoke his supervised release and to sentence 
him to ten months’ additional imprisonment.  Sleboda timely appealed.1 
On appeal, Sleboda’s counsel moves to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967), but both he and the Government contend that, because Sleboda has 
completed his ten-month sentence, his appeal is now moot.  That contention rests on the 
constitutional requirement that where, as here, a previously incarcerated individual 
challenges the validity and terms of the judgment against him, “some concrete and 
continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration” must exist for the individual’s 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3565, and we 
ordinarily would have jurisdiction to review its final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
lack that jurisdiction here, however, for the reasons stated below. 
 3 
 
challenge to present a live case or controversy.  Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998).  
If such an injury does not exist, then the case is moot and we must dismiss it for lack of 
jurisdiction.  See id. 
Of course, collateral consequences flow from a criminal conviction, and thus a 
challenge to a conviction is not moot when the convict completes his term of 
incarceration.  Id. at 8.  But we do not likewise presume collateral consequences to flow 
from a supervised release revocation, United States v. Huff, 703 F.3d 609, 611-12 (3d Cir. 
2013), and, even if a revocation could be used against a previously incarcerated 
individual in a future proceeding, that possible consequence is “a possibility rather than a 
certainty or even a probability” and does not provide a ground for federal jurisdiction, 
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-16. 
Such is the case here.  Sleboda has completed his sentence, and he cannot claim 
collateral consequences based on the possibility that his revocation will be used to his 
detriment in a future proceeding.  Id.  His appeal is therefore moot, and we lack 
jurisdiction to proceed further.  See id. at 7. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this appeal. 
